Carbon Canal Co. et al v. Sanpete Water Users Association et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Carbon Canal Co. et al v. Sanpete Water Users
Association et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. J. Skeen; Therald N. Jensen; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Association, No. 9133 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3475
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CARBON CANAL COMPANY, a cf 
poration, PIONEER DITCH CO 
PANY # 1, a corporation, PIONE 
WATER COMPANY #2, a corpora-
tion, ALLRED DITCH COMPANY, a 
corporation, WELLINGTON CANAL ____ ci;; 
COMPANY, a corporation, BRYNER-
HANSEN DITCH CO., a corporation, 
BRYNER - PLOUTZ DITCH CO., 
SPRING GLEN CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation, O'BERTO DITCH COM-
PANY, PRICE CANAL COMPANY, 
PRICE RIVER WATER USERS ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation, PRICE CITY, 
a municipal corporation and HELPER 
CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SANPETE WATER USERS ASSOCIA-
TION, a corporation, and WAYNE D. 
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, Respondents, 
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORA-
LED 
Ai,ll 5 1960 
No. 
9133 
NtV~~SrTY OF UTAH 
JUL 1 0 1967 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS LAW UBRAU 
TION, a corporation, Intervenor. 
E. J. SKEEN 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 4 
STATEMENT 0 F POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 12 
ARGUMENT ---------- ____________ ---------------------------------------------------- 12 
Point 1. The applicant has not made a ~~proper showing of 
diligence" on application No. 9593 within the 
meaning of Section 73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953------------ 12 
Point 2. There. has been no nproper showing of reason-
able cause for delay." ·-------------------------------------------- 2 3 
Point 3. There are no findings of fact, of diligence or 
reasonable cause for delay which support the 
decree. _ _ ____ ____ _______ __ ___ ___ _ ____ _ __ _ _ ___ __________________ _______ _______ 2 8 
CON CL USI 0 N ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 0 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CITED 
Rule 52 (a) ----------------------------------··------------------------------------------- 28 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 73-3-12, U. C.A., 19 53 ------------------------------------------------ 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
CASES CITED 
Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304, 33 P. 568 ---------------------------- 18 & 19 
Colorado etc Co. v. Rocky Ford etc. Co., 3 Colo. App. 545, 
34 p. 580 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Eardley v. Terry, 94 U. 367, 77 P. 2d, 362 -------------------------- 13 
Gaddis lnv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284 ________ 28 
In re Thompson Estate, 72 U. 17, 35; 269 P. 103 -.,-------------- 28 
In re White River, 15 5 Or. 148, 62 P. 2d, 22 ______________________ 18 
Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N .M. 480 ---------------------------------------------- 18· 
Low v. Rizor, 2 5 Or. 5 51, 3 7 P. 82 -------------------------------------- 19 
Maricopa County Mun. Water Cons. District v. Southwest 
Cotton Co., 39 Arizona 65, 4 P. 2d, 369 ____________________ 16 
Morse v. Gold Beach Water Co., 160 Or. 301, 84 P. 2d 113-- 22 
Ophir Silver Min. Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 97 Am. 
Dec. 5 50 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 16 & 18 
Reich v. Rebellion Silver Min. Co., 3 U. 254, 2 P. 703-------- 28 
Rio Pureco Irrigation Company v. Jastro, 19 N.M. 149 
141 p. 8 7 4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Seaweard v. Pacific Livestock Co., 49 Or. 157, 88 P. 963---- 19 
Sieber v. Fink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 ------------------------------------ 16 
Still v. Palouse Irrigation Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 P. 466__ 19 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Kenney on Irrigation and Water Rights (2nd Ed.) 739---- 18 
I Wiel on Water Rights in the Western States, 3rd Edition, 
pp. 3 9 8-3 99 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
I Wiel on Water Rights in the Western States, 3rd Edition, 
pp. 415 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court· 
of the State of Utah 
CARBON CANAL COMPANY, a cor-
poration, PIONEER DITCH COM-
pANY # 1, a corporation, PIONEER 
WATER COMPANY #2, a corpora-
tion, ALLRED DITCH COMPANY, a 
corporation, WELLINGTON CANAL 
COMPANY, a corporation, BRYNER-
HANSEN DITCH CO., a corporation, 
BRYNER - PLOUTZ DITCH CO., 
SPRING GLEN CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation, O'BERTO DITCH COM-
PANY, PRICE CANAL COMPANY, 
PRICE RIVER WATER USERS ASSO- No. 
CIATION, a corporation, PRICE CITY, 9133 
a municipal corporation and HELPER 
CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SANPETE WATER USERS ASSOCIA-
TION, a corporation, and WAYNE D. 
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, Respondents, 
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, Intervenor. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This is an appeal frotn a decree of the District Court of 
Sanpete County granting to the respondent, Sanpete Water 
Users Association, an extension of time for a period of two 
years within which to file proof of appropriation on water 
application No. 9593. The suit in which the decree was entered 
was filed to review a decision of the state engineer finding 
that the applicant had shown diligence and granting an exten-
sion of time for filing proof. The Sanpete Water Users 
Association will be referred to in this brief as the {(applicant." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Application No. 9593 was filed by John L. Bench on 
September 11, 1924,. to appropriate 15,000 acre feet of water 
from Gooseberry Creek in the Price River drainage for storage 
in a reservoir to be constructed at the site described in the 
application as the {(Narrows." The application propose~ the 
construction of a tunnel to carry the stored water from the 
reservoir in the Price River drainage through the mountain to 
lands in the San Pitch River drainage in Sanpete County where 
it would be used for irrigation purposes. (See Exhibit 3.) It 
was assigned to the Cottonwood-Gooseberry Irrigation Com-
pany on April 15, 1948 and from that Company to the Sanpete 
Water Users Association on April 17, 1950. (Ex. 4). 
The application was rejected by the state engineer on 
May 18, 1925. An appeal to the District Court from the order 
rejecting the application was filed within 60 days thereafter. 
The application and the action for review lay dorrnant fo1' a 
period of 11zore than 14 years. The case was finally tried and 
a judgment was entered directing approval of the application 
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on February 11, 1939. (See Ex. 2). Since then the applicant 
has filed requests for extension of time to make proof on the 
following dates: 
August 26, 1943 
September 4, 1948 
August 29, 1950 
March 11, 1953 
March 11, 1958 
The 1943 request recites that more than $20,000.00 had 
been expended for. exploration work and surveying. This was 
done by the Bureau of Reclamation at the Bureau's expense. 
(See Ex. 30). 
The state engineer granted an extension to September 5, 
1948. In 1948 the Cottonwood-Gooseberry Irrigation Company 
(then owner of the application) frankly admitted that, tCNo 
work has been done on real construction.'' (See Exhibit 31.) 
Nevertheless, the state engineer granted an extension to Sep-
tember 5, 1950. 
The 1950 and 195 3 requests are· identical, with respect 
to the description of work done, both mentioning the surveying 
and test drilling, and again referring to the $20,000.00 spent 
by the Bureau of Reclamation to explore and survey. (Exhibits 
5 and 6). The state engineer granted additional extensions to 
March 11, 195 3 and March 11, 1958. (Exhibits 5 and 6). 
The 1958 request, which is relied upon to support a further 
extension, incorporates by reference the information contained 
in the 195 3 request, and then says that this statement will be 
limited, ((to the nature and extent of work done since the 
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date of the last extension." This very appropriate assertion 
is followed by ( 1) a quotation from the report of the Regional 
Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, ( 2) a statement that 
certain gauging weirs were installed along the San Pitch River, 
( 3) a discussion of the failure of Congress to appropriate 
funds for the Gooseberry project, ( 4) an assertion that the 
applicant has made a feasibility study of the project on a re-
duced basis and that applicant has applied to the Utah Water 
and Power Board for $180,000.00, ( 5) rr On February 21, 
1958 applicant commenced work to gain access to the tunnel 
site, and on March 5, 1958 actual excavation for the tunnel 
was commenced/' and ( 6) a statement that ((The Bureau of 
Reclamation has expended $20,219.00 since January, 1953 on 
continued investigation. 
The applicant states that a ((reason why the extension 
should be granted," is that since it appears that no federal 
funds are immediately available, ((the applicant must finance 
the project through personal resources" and such assistance as 
it may obtain from state and federal agencies. It is stated that 
it will take some time to accumulate all of the necessary funds. 
(Emphasis added.) 
A hearing was held on the 1958 request for extension of 
time and thereafter the state engineer granted an extension 
to January 31, 1961 with the warning that tea request for an 
extension of time submitted at the end of the period now 
granted ·must be supported by evidence of substantial progress 
toward construction of the project contemplated by the appli-
cation" (R. 8). 
The evidence introduced at the trial consisted of (a) a 
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map showing the locations of the dam site described in the 
application, and the Mammoth site (Ex. P-1); (b) the District 
Court file in the case in which the Court directed the approval 
of the application (Ex. D-2); (c) application No. 9593, 
(Ex. D-3); (d) assignment of application No. 9593, (Ex. 
D-4); (e) requests for extension of time (Ex. D-5, 6); (f) 
letters, minutes and engineering reports (Ex. 7-22, 33); (g) 
testimony of efforts made to get federal and state assistance 
to construct the project (Tr. 61, 62, 65, 87, 89); (h) testimony 
regarding construction work (Tr. 154-164); (i) testimony 
regarding the feasibility of the project (Tr. 220-229, 251-
252); and (j) testimony reg~rding the length of time required 
for engineering studies to determine the feasibility of the 
project (Tr. 243-248). 
The witnesses, McAllister and Jensen, called by the de-
fendants, testified (Tr. 77, 87-92) regarding the many efforts 
made over the years since 1936 to get the project authorized 
and financed by a state or federal agency. These included the 
following: 
1933-Bureau of Reclamation Report (Tr. 106) 
1936-Requests of assistance from the Utah Water Storage 
Commission (Tr. 87) 
1936-Requests of help from W.P.A. or P.W.A. (Tr. 62, 
S7, 88) 
1937-Case Wheeler Act project request (Tr. 88) 
1946-Bureau of Reclamation Report-Result of study 
since 1928. (Tr. 104, Ex. 12) 
1953-Bureau of Reclamation Report (Ex. 14) 
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1957-Bureau of Reclamation Letter described as a pre-
liminary report (Tr. 129, Ex. 15) 
1958-Application to Utah Water and Power Board (Ex. 
28) 
Despite the efforts to promote the project there has never 
been action taken on any report which resulted in making' 
federal or state money available for project construction. In 
factJ there is no evidence that a final plan for the project at 
the rr Narrows site" has ever been formulated. In 1946, the 
Regional Director transmitted to the Commissioner, Bureau of 
Reclamation, a very detailed report on the Gooseberry project, 
and recommended: 
(2) Inasmuch as only a small portion of the project 
construction cost can be repaid by the water users and 
inasmuch as the project water supply is not assured, 
development of the potential Gooseberry project not 
be auth9rized at the present time. (Ex. 12, P. 8). 
In 1953 the UN arrows site~' was discarded and the Regional 
Director of the Bureau of Reclamation recommended a project 
at the UMammoth site'' (located about 3 miles downstream 
from the uNarrows site") which is not covered by application 
No. 9 59 3. In 19 57 a preliminary report in letter form stated 
that a project at the uMammoth site" was infeasible and the 
uNarrows site" was suggested. No report has ever been ap-
proved. 
A private engineer, Richard C. Hansen, was employed 
by the defendant Association to do engineering work on the 
Gooseberry project on February 11, 1958, just one month 
before the expiration of the last extension (March 11, 1958) · 
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Mr. Hansen stated that immediately after his employment and 
prior to March 11, 1958, he collected engineering data from 
the Bureau of Reclamation; that he used the data to locate the 
west portal of the proposed tunnel, and that he staked the 
location on the ground (Tr. 156). Mr. Hansen testified that 
when the staking and bulldozing was done at the west portal 
in February and 1v1arch, 1958, there was six feet of snow on 
the ground ( 1 r. 166) and he conceded that the Association 
had no plans. He said, ttl concede the remark that we had no 
plans, (Tr. 168). Mr. Hansen admitted that he had done 
no engineering work on the dam and had done nothing on 
water supply (Tr. 168). 
Keith Hansen, the president of the Association, testified 
that it is uncertain whether the Association will get money 
to build the project from the Utah Water and Power Board, 
and Bureau of Reclamation, or some other source, and that 
there has been no approval of the project by either ag.ency 
(Tr. 194, 195). He admitted that the Association had no 
plans except for the tunnel (Tr. 203). 
The plaintiff called Laurence C. Monson, a hydrographer~ 
employed by the state engineer for many years ( 1938-1956) 
who testified that he had been familiar with Gooseberry 
Creek since 1938, that he had made water measurements, and 
that he had made a study of water rights (Tr. 220-224). Mr. 
Monson further testified that he had studied water supply 
records on the Price River to determine whether in each year 
since 1945 there would be water available for application No. 
9593 at the {(Narrows site" on Gooseberry Creek. T.he results 
are tabulated below: 
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Year Water Av.ailable 
1946 None (Tr. 224) 
1947 None (Tr. 224) 
1948 None (Tr. 224) 
1949 Perhaps some (Tr. 225) 
1950 8040 ac. ft. (Tr. 225) 
1951 None (Tr. 225) 
1952 20,750 ac. ft. (Tr. 225) 
1953 None (Tr. 225) 
1954 None (Tr. 225) 
1955 None (Tr. 225) 
1956 None (Tr. 225) 
1957 35,790 ac. ft. (Tr. 225) 
Mr. Monson Indicated that the foregoing tabulation was 
base upon filling the Scofield Reservoir right of 30,000 acre 
feet. The figures did not include filling direct flow rights that 
are prior to application No. 9593 (Tr. 228). No loss by evap-
oration, seepage or canal losses were taken into consideration 
(Tr. 229). The testimony on water supply is not contradicted. 
Win Templeton, a consulting engineer of wide exp~ri­
ence, testified that he had made a water supply study of the 
Price River drainage area and that based upon that study he 
had determined that there would be water available at the 
Gooseberry site only in one year out of four (Tr. 252). He 
said that, with water available in only one year out of four 
the project would not be feasible. Mr. Templeton also testified 
that it would take one year to make a preliminary survey of 
the project and that, with drilling, the cost of such survey 
would be $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 (Tr. 246, 247). 
George Waterman, a Carbon County resident since 1908, 
testified that he had taken measurements to determine water 
10 
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losses in the Carbon Canal and thait the canal loss from the 
head of the canal to his land was twenty-five per cent (Tr. 265). 
Mr. Waterman said that on March 12, 1958, he went to the 
west portal of the proposed tunnel and observed the work 
that had been done and talked to the tCCat" operator. The 
operator told him that the 12th of March tCW as his fourth 
day" and that uhe possibly put in an average of four, maybe 
five hours a day" (Tr. 269). Exhibit 32 is a photograph showing 
the work at the West portal. 
It was stipulated by the parties that the record may show 
that the appellants and the intervenor are the owners of sub-
stantially all of the decreed water rights on the Price River 
set out in the Morse decree of 1910 (Tr. 213). Exhibit 32, 
which is a copy of application No. 13,334 filed on Feb:uary 
13, 1940 was received in evidence. This application is for 
the appropriation of 50 second feet of water from Cabin 
Hollow Creek in the Price River drainage and is subsequent 
in priority to application No. 9593. Also, Exhibit 33, being 
a very excellent and comprehensive report of water supply 
for Price City, dated Decen1ber, 1957, prepared by Templeton 
and Link, consulting engineers, was received in evidence. This 
report contains a tabulation and analysis of water rights on 
Price River. 
The trial court made no findings of fact to support a con-
clusion of law that the applicant had been diligent or that 
there was reasonable cause for delay. Paragraph 8 and 9 of 
the Findings of Fact state: 
8. Under all the facts and circumstances in this case, 
Defendant Sanpete Water Users' Association has shown 
11 
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reasonable diligence in proceeding to prove up on its 
application and to put the water to beneficial use. 
9. The_ court further finds that said Sanpete Water 
Users' Association has shown reasonable cause for 
delay in constructing the entire works and diverting 
the water to the lands in Sanpete Valley (R. 27). 
' . 
The decree granted an extension of time to prove up on 
application No. 9593 for a per~od of two years from the date 
nthat this order shall become :final by lapse of time in which 
to file an appeal therefrom or in the event an appeal is taken 
to the Supreme Court, from the date of the issuance by said 
Court of the remittitur on final judgment affirming this judg-
ment" (R. 30) . This appeal is taken from the decree. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The applicant has not made a ((proper showing of dili-
gence" on application No. 9593 within the meaning of Section 
73-3-12, U.C.A. 1953. 
2. There has been no nproper showing of reasonable cause 
for delay." 
3. There are no findings of fact of diligence or reasonable 
cause for delay which support the decree. 
ARGUMENT 
DILIGENCE HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN. 
It is settled that when a suit is filed pursuant to Section 
73-3-12, U.C.A., 1953, to review a decision of the state engi-
12 
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neer, the district court must in a trial de novo consider and 
decide the same questions as those to be considered and decided 
by the state engineer. Upon appeal the same issues are before 
this Court. Eardley v. Terry, 94 U. 367, 77 P 2d, 362. 
The pertinent part of the statute involved in this appeal 
provides: 
73-3-12. The construction of the works and the 
application of water to beneficial use shall be dili-
gently prosecuted to completion within the time 
fixed by the state engineer.. Extensions of. time, not 
exceeding fifty yeftrS from the date of approval of the 
application, may be granted by the state ~engineer on 
proper showing of diligence or reasonable · cause for 
delay. Extensions .not exceeding fourteen years after 
the date of approval may- be granted· by the state 
engineer upon a ·sufficient showing by affidavit. But 
extensions beyond fourteen years shall be granted only 
after application, publication of notice, and a hearing 
before the state engineer. · 
It will.be noted that the word uor" is used. The applicant 
must, . therefore, make· a proper showing of diligence_, or of 
reasonable cause for de.lay; otherwise, its request for extension 
must be denied. These were the issues before the state engineer 
and before the district court. 
In discussing this question, we shall first treat briefly the 
fundamentals of the water law which require diligence as a 
condition to c c relating back'' the priority of the right, and the 
cases construing statutes which authorize extensions of time. 
Section 73-3-12 was ·enacted to put into statutory form 
and to make definite and certain the cc doctrine of relation" 
which 1s that if an ·appropriator, after initiating his appro-
13 
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priation, proceeds diligent! y to construct the necessary diversion 
and control facilities and to put the water to beneficial use, 
the priority for all water appropriated, pursuant to the original 
scheme, will relate back to the date of original appropriation. 
The object of statutory provisions similar to the Utah 
statute is well discussed in I Wiel on Water Rights in the 
Western States, 3rd Edition, on pages 398, 399: 
368. Object of Statutory Provisions. - The early 
customs out of which the law of appropriation grew 
were based (as has been already discussed) on the 
principle that rights on the public domain were open 
to all, the first possessor being protected; and that all, 
also, should have an equal chance. As is said in Ne-
vada etc. Co. v. Kidd, they did not countenance anyone 
acting ccthe dog in the manger." Many attempted to 
secure monopoly of waters by merely posting notices 
or making a pretense at building canals, ditches, etc., 
and tried by this means to hold a right to the water 
against later comers who bona fide sought to construct 
the necessary works for its use. From those conditions 
grew up a method of making an appropriation to apply 
specifically to rival claimants while the construction 
work, often prolonged, was going on. If the first comer 
bona fide and diligently prosecuted his work, his right 
on its completion related back to the very beginning 
of it; otherwise the others were preferred. This method 
of making the appropriation was, under the early de-
cisions, substantially the same as that now provided 
for this purpose, in the Civil Code of California. The 
provisions of the Civil Code of California are merely 
to fix the procedure whereby a certain definite time 
might be established as the date at which title should 
accrue by relation. 
369. Provisions Chiefly Declaratory Only.-In codi-
fying the rules governing this method in California 
14 
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(and the early statutes of other States based thereon), 
the rules laid down in the decisions of the court were 
not materially changed; for the whole code upon this 
subject is substantially only declaratory of the pre-
existing law. 
The same author discusses the meaning of the word 
"diligence" as used in statutes similar to ours on page 415 of 
Volume 1: 
Diligence does not require unusual or extraordinary 
efforts, but only such constancy and steadiness of pur-
pose or of labor as is usual with men engaged in like 
enterprises. Matters incident to the person and not to 
the enterprise are not such circumstances as will ex-
cuse great delay in the work. In one case, for two years 
work was done on the ditch for three months only, 
and the court said: ((Diligence is defined to be the 
(steady application to business of any kind, constant 
effort to accomplish any undertaking.' " The law does 
not require any unusual or extraordinary effort, but 
only that which is usual, ordinary, and reasonable. The 
diligence required in cases of this kind is that con-
stancy and steadiness of purpose or labor which is usual 
with men engaged in like enetrprises, and who desire 
a speedy accomplishment of their designs. Such assi-
duity in the prosecution of the enterprise as will mani-
fest to the world a bona fide intention to complete it 
within a reasonable time. It is the doing of an act, or 
series of acts, with all practical expedition, with no 
delay, except such as may be incident to the work ... 
Rose during this time may have dreamed of his canal 
completed, seen it with his mind's eye yielding him a 
great revenue; he may have indulged the hope of provi-
denti,al interference in his favor, but this cannot be 
called a diligent prosecution of his enterprise. 
The doctrine of relation is well defined in the early Colo-
rado case of Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901, as follows: 
15 
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Alt.hough the appropriation is not deemed complete 
until the actual diversion or use of water, still if such 
work be prosecuted · with reasonable . diligence, the 
right relates back to the time when the first step was 
taken. 
The case of Ophir Silver Min. Co. v. Carpenter~ 4 Nev. 
·534, decided in January, 1869, involved an application of the 
doctrine of relation to the facts. The evidence showed that 
a water appropriation was initiated in 1858. We quote: 
Thus, it appears, th3:t from the fall of 1859 to the 
· summer o~ ~862, a period of over two years and a half, 
work was done upon the ditch for about three months 
.only; that _was during the year 1861 when Rose testifies 
that from seventeen to twenty men were employed.-
These facts, it is argued on behalf of defendants, show 
. such diligence on the part of their grantor in the prose-
cution of his ~riginal design as to make their right to 
the quantity of water now diverted by them relate to 
the time when Rose in the year 1858 qid the first act 
toward appropriation.--In our judgment those facts 
exhibit an utter want of diligence in the prosecution 
of the design _wh~ch it is claimed was undertaken by 
Rose. (Emphasis added.) 
The cases uniforn1l y hold that mere lack of means with 
which to prosecute work is never, ipso- facto, a sufficient excuse 
for delay by an appropria~or -in applying water to _beneficial 
use. Maricopa County Mun. Water Cons. District v. Southwest 
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P. 2d, 369. · 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico had occasion in the 
case of Rio Puerco Irrigation Company v. Jastro, 19 N.M. 149, 
141 P. 874, to construe a statute sin1ilar to ours which provided: 
t t Section 29. The construction of the works shall be 
diligently prosecuted to completion " 
16 
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The application for appropriation of water was filed on 
August 28, 1907. The application was approved on July 21, 
1908 .and the Territorial Engineer required that work be com-
menced by Nlarch 1, 1909; that one-fifth of the work be com-
pleted on or before January 1, 1910, and that all work be 
completed before July 21, 1912. Upon timely application, the 
engineer extended the time to commence and complete the 
work for an additional 3-months period. A secohd request 
for extension was filed on May 25, 1909~ 
The applicant made a showing. that it had been unable 
to sell bonds which it proposed to issue, and, because of such 
fact did not have the money to enable it to begin and prosecute 
the work. The board of water commissioners refused to grant 
an extension of time and the applicant appealed to the District 
Court which affirmed. The case was· then ap.pealed to the 
Supreme Court and that Court affirmed. The Court held that 
the statute was declaratory of the law as it existed prior to its 
enactment and stated: 
The doctrine of relation has been universally ap-
plied by the courts, in arid states, in the appropriation 
of water. Where notice is required by statute of the 
intention to appropriate, the right relates back to the 
time such notice is given, in the authorized manner; 
in the absence of a statute, requiring notice, or other 
act, the right relates back to the time when the first 
step was taken. This doctrine does not apply, or pro-
tect the intending appropriator, however, unless he 
prosecutes his work of diversion with reasonable dili-
gence. 
The authorities all agree that the mere lack of means 
with which to prosecute the work is not a suffic.ient 
excuse of delay. As was said by the Supreme Court of 
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Nevada, in the case of Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. 
Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 97 Am. Dec. 550: 
It would be a most dangerous doctrine to hold 
that the ill health or pecuniary inability of a claim-
ant of a water privilege will dispense with the 
necessity of actual appropriation within a reason-
able time, or the diligence which is usually re-
quired in the prosecution of the work necessary for 
the purpose. We find no recognition of such doc-
trine in the law. Nor are we disposed to adopt it 
as the rule to govern cases of this kind. 
See, also, Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304, 33 Pac. 568; 
Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N. M. 480; Kinney on Irrigation 
& Water Rights (2nd Ed.) 739. 
Such being the law, in the absence of statutory regu-
lations, the only remaining question is whether it was 
the intention of our lawmakers to change this rule ... 
Financial inability is not under the statute, as it was 
not without the statute, such a cause as will excuse lack 
of diligence in the prosecution of the work. Hence it 
necessarily follows that the territorial engineer was 
not authorized to grant an extension of time within 
which to complete one-fifth of the work, or all of the 
work, where the only basis for the request was the 
financial inability of the intending appropriator or 
his inability to sell bonds with which to procure money 
to prosecute the work, and the district court properly 
refused the requested extension of time. 
Our statute, like the New Mexico statute, was enacted to 
declare the doctrine of relation under which financial inability 
to construct the works was not a sufficient excuse for delay. 
In the Oregon case of In re White River, 155 Or. 148, 
62 P. 2d 22, the Supreme Court considered the same question 
as is presented here- whether an applicant for water had 
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shown sufficient diligence to justify an extension of time. It 
appeared from the evidence that the applicant had had two 
previous extensions and was without funds to construct the 
project. The court held that the applicant had not shown 
diligence and denied the extension. 
The following cases involve the question of diligence and 
the application of the doctrine of relation. They support the 
reasoning and conclusions above. 
Colorado etc. Co. v. Rocky Ford etc. Co., 3 Colo. 
App. 545, 34 P. 580. 
Seaweard v. Pacific Livestock Co., 49 Or. 157, 88 P. 
963. 
Still v. Palouse Irrigation Co., 64 Wash. 606, 117 P. 
466. 
Cole v. Logan, 24 Or. 304, 33 P. 568. 
Low v. Rizor, 25 Or. 551, 37 P. 82. 
An analysis of the evidence, briefly summarized above, 
establishes the following: 
1. No plan for construction of the work has been finally 
adopted by the applicant. 
2. With no plan it is apparent that there has been no 
ttconstancy or steadiness of purpose" in constructing works. 
Except for small amounts spent for ttsubterfuge" purposes, 
there has been no showing that the sponsors of the project 
have made any investment whatever, or, indeed, have done 
anything except to promote the spending of money by others. 
3. The history of this project shows procrastination and 
delay for 34 years. 
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The foregoing will be briefly discussed in the order stated 
above. 
1. The applicant has never had a final, approved plan 
for ·construction of works and for application of water to 
beneficial use. Numerous ((plans" have been considered 'by 
the Bureau o£ Reclamation over the years. Several repqrts have 
been prepared and as far as the writers know, a feasible plan 
has never yet been produced by anyone, aJthough intermittent 
study by government agencies has gone on for more than 30 
yeats. At least -two principal plans have been studied ( 1) the 
so-called Mammoth Plan covered· by the 1953 -Bureau of 
Reclamation report, which provides for a dam some 3 miles 
below the point of diversion described in application No. 
9593, and (2) the plan for construction of a d~m at the 
((Narrows Site" described in application No. 9593. Exhibit 
15- offered by ·the applicant indicates that due to the increase 
in construction costs the so-called ((Mammoth Plan" has a 
benefit-cost ratio of less than unity. The same letter suggests 
a plan for diversion of only 6,300-acre feet of water to Sanpete 
County and indicates that the _project area would b~ reduced 
from 16,400 acres to 3,630 which would receive a supplement~! 
supply with a reduction of costs from $5,367,000.00 to 
$2,204,000.00. By simple division the cost of water· for sup-
plemental use would be $607.00 per acre. This letter from the 
Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation indicates, 
on itse face, that it is subject to revision.' The evidence shows 
that it is merely a suggestion and has not been approved (Tr. 
129). 
The original application describes a point· in Section 24, 
Twp. 13 S., R. 5 E., S.L.B.M. (See Exhibit 2). In 1941, change 
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application A -1600 was filed to change the point of diversion 
from the point described above to a point in Section 6, Twp. 
13 S., R. 6 E., S.L.B. & M. The change application has not 
been advertised. It has been dormant for 17 years, indicating 
that the applicant does not yet know where the project will 
be built. 
We believe that the applicant is relying upon the activity 
of the Bureau of Reclamation to support a showing of diligence. 
The Bureau of Reclamation has not done any construction work 
nor has it done anything except to make surveys and do ex-
ploration work to determine whether a project is feasible. 
Although the Utah Congressional Delegation has in the past 
actively supported the Gooseberry Project, no appropriations 
have been made because of one thing. The reports do not 
indicate that the project is feasible. Exhibit 15 shows that the 
benefits (which are liberally presented) , are less than the cost. 
If the applicant is right, and the Bureau surveys should be 
considered to show diligence, the applicant would be in the 
position of urging that surveys showing an infeasible project 
should be treated by the state engineer as construction work 
to support an extension of time for constructing the project. 
The fundamental unsoundness of the applicant's position is 
abundantly clear. 
To summarize, there is no showing that the applicant 
has ever made a complete engtneering study at its own expense, 
but has been content to wait for some government agency to 
come up with something and place it in its lap. The witness, 
Hansen, said that he had studied the tunnel but had done 
nothing with respect to the water supply or the dam. The 
application has been pending for 34 years without a plan 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and without location of the site. No actual work has been 
done except to remove snow and ((scratch" at the west tunnel 
portal to make a showing of diligence. This will be discussed 
more fully below. 
2. The texts and cases cited above indicate that diligence 
includes na constancy or steadiness of purpose in constructing 
work." After 34 years the applicant has not yet got a plan, so 
obviously there could be no showing of constancy or steadiness 
of purpose except in the promotion line. If desire for planning 
at the expense of others and promotion of appropriations by 
the government were to be considered diligence, there has been 
a showing of that in abundance. But that is not the law. 
A frantic effort was made to show actual construction 
the last few days before the expiration of the applicant's 
time, for filing proof. After a lapse of 3 3 years, in the middle 
of the winter, and when there was six feet of snow on the 
ground, the applicant decided the time was ripe to commence 
the tunnel; and without a plan or financial ability to continue 
work, caused a patch of snow to be removed from the moun-
tainside, and a small excavation to be made, for no purpose 
other than to make a showing in support of the request for 
extension. This is not a sufficient showing to meet the require-
ments of the law. The work required by the statute is work 
so substantial in character as to manifest good faith and intent 
to exercise reasonable diligence in the completion of the 
project. Morse v. Gold Beach Water Co., 160 Or. 301, 84 P. 
2d 113. I am sure this Court will not be fooled by this obvious 
effort at subterfuge. 
3. The history of the application is rather fully related 
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above and will not be repeated. It is a story of delay-a story 
of "waiting for the breaks" to get a project financed with a 
large subsidy. The fact is that the history of the application 
is long because the project is not financially sound and there 
is an inadequate water supply as will be demonstrated under 
the next heading. 
REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY HAS NOT BEEN 
SHOWN. 
It is apparent that the question of whether there has been 
reasonable cause for delay must depend upon the facts and 
circumstances. 
The feasibility of the project must necessarily be con-
sidered in connection ,·vith (treasonable cause for delay." It 
would be extremely unsound for the Court to grant an extension 
for construction of a project which is clearly infeasible as is 
the case here. It is unreasonable to tie up the water of the 
Price River for a project which is obviously too expensive 
to build. After more than 30 years of intensive study under 
every federal program which has come along (see testimony 
of Thomas Jenson, Tr. 87-92) the defendant points to the 
letter of the Regional Director as the basis for a ((plan" and as 
indicated above that plan would cost $607.00 per acre for 
supplemental water (not a full supply) . 
The feasibility must also- be considered from the stand-
point of water supply. Engineer Laurence C. Monson testified 
that in nine years out of the last twelve years, there was 
no water in Gooseberry Creek available for storage over and 
above that required to satisfy the primary storage and direct 
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flow rights (Tr. 224-228). Any idea that holdover storage 
would carry the irrigators over a dry spell is unsound. The 
records show without contradiction that during the three-year 
period, 1946, 1947 and 1948, there was absolutely no water 
available for storage at the Gooseberry site (Tr. 224). During 
the four-year period from 1953 to 1956 inclusive there was 
no water (Tr. 225). 
The lack of a qependable water supply at the Gooseberry 
site is given as a reason for rejection of the project proposed 
by application No. 9593 in the 1953 Bureau of Reclamation 
report, Exhibit 14. On page 21 it is stated: 
ALTERNATIVE PLANS OF DEVELOPMENT 
42. The Gooseberry project outlined in this report 
was selected as the most desirable means for developing 
the area after consideration of several alternative plans. 
Study was given to three possibilities, besides the adopted 
plan, for diverting Price River water to Sanpete Valley. 
All of these alternatives were rejected} however, be-
cause of excessive costs for the benefits received or 
unstable water supply. One of the plans involved 
storage of Gooseberry Creek waters at the Mammoth 
site as in the adopted plan but with the addition of 
feeder canals to bring water to the reservoir from the 
headwaters of Huntington Creek and from Cabin 
Hollow Creek, tributary to Gooseberry Creek below 
the dam site. Water would be diverted to Cottonwood 
Creek as in the adopted plan. Another plan involved 
a reservoir at the Gooseberry site about 3 miles above 
the Mamomth site and a transmountain dive1'sion tun-
nel from the reservoir to Cottonwood Creek. This 
plan would utilize water of Gooseberry Creek as well 
as water from tributaries of Huntington Creek that 
would be brought to Gooseberry Creek by feeder 
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canals. 1'he third plan involved no storage. The un-
regulated flow of Gooseberry Creek would be conveyed 
to Cottonwood Creek through a diversion tunnel. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the 1957 letter of the Regional Director, Exhibit 15, 
the following appears: 
The costs for the J.\!Iammoth plan as presented in the 
195 3 report, when increased to present-day prices, re-
duced the benefit-cost ratio for the project to less than 
unity. Also, under the 19 53 plan, a serious question, 
which we have previous! y discussed with you, as to 
water available for the Scofield Reservoir when 11,700 
acre feet of water was diverted from the Price River 
for the Go~seberry Project. 
An explanation as to how rising construction costs would 
make the rejected nNarrows Plan" feasible, and would make 
the ((Mammoth Plan" infeasible would have been interesting 
indeed. None was attempted. 
Engineer Win 'Templeton testified that in his op1n1on 
the project was infeasible because of inadequacy of the water 
supply (Tr. 252). He also testified that with the drill holes 
and topographic survey of the Bureau available for use that 
engineers could ma~e a preliminary study of the project to 
determine its approximate cost and feasibility in a couple of 
months. He said one year would be adequate for the study 
and surveys necessary for construction (Tr. 246-247). This 
testimony is not contradicted. The applicants have had 34 
years since the application was filed and 20 years since it was 
app1'oved and have not even got a plan. 
It is the duty of the Court as it was the duty of the state 
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engineer to carefully consider a request for extension of time 
with the following important matters in mind: 
1. Is the project physically and financially sound so that 
if the extension is granted, that there is reasonable 
assurance of success? 
2. The extent, if any, of investments in the works pro-
posed by the project. 
3. The cost of the project and the cost of the remaining 
works to be constructed. 
4. The reasons for delay and assurance that the works will 
be completed within the extended period. 
If this approach to the problem is used (and it is funda-
mentally sound), what is the result? The answers are pretty 
obvious: 
1. There is no plan. The feasibility of the plan cannot be 
considered because the applicant itself does not know 
what it is. 
2. The applicant has made no investments except in con-
nection with the frantic effort at subterfuge which 
obviously should not be considered. 
3. No one knows what the cost will be because there is 
no plan. 
4. The reason for delay is that during the past 34 years, 
with a liberal expenditure of public funds, no one has 
yet con1e up with a reasonable plan. There is no reason 
to believe that with rising construction costs there will 
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be better success in the next 2 years or in the next 5 
years. 
The statute speaks of (treasonable cause for delay." It is 
obvious that there is no (treasonable cause" where the project 
is infeasible because of the inadequacy of the water supply 
and excessive costs. There is no dispute in the evidence. The 
testimony of Engineers Templeton and Monson is not con-
tradicted. In fact, it is corroborated by the above quoted 
excerpt from the comprehensive Bureau report, Exhibit 14, 
page 21, which rejects the ((Narrows site project" because of 
Hexcessive costs" and ({unstable water supply." 
The reason the appellants vigorously oppose further ex-
tensions of time is clear. According to Mr. Monson's detailed 
analysis if the water covered by application No. 9593 should 
be stored at the ((Narrows site" and taken to Sanpete Valley 
there would be a shortage on the Carbon County side of the 
mountain in at least 8 years out of 12. This is confirmed by 
Mr. Templeton. See Exhibit 33, page 77, where it is stated: 
4. The Gooseberry Project cannot be built without 
usurping Carbon County water rights with resulting 
damage to the industrial future of the area. It is doubt-
ful if the Gooseberry Project could ever repay more 
than ten cents on each dollar of construction cost, 
while industrial use of water in Carbon County will 
result in immeasurable benefits to the State of Utah 
and the United States of America. 
Water applications subsequent to No. 9593 owned by the 
appellants and the intervenor will, of course, be firmed up if 
the request for extension should be denied. 
No facts have been produced which could be considered 
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reasonable cause for delay. On the contrary, the evidence shows 
good reasons for denying the applicant's request. The facts 
of lack of an adequate water supply and excessive costs are 
not disputed. The applicant cannot point to a single report 
after more than 30 years investigation which would justify 
a further extension. 
THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT OF DILIGENCE 
OR REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY WHICH SUP-
PORT .THE DECREE. 
Rule 52 (a) insofar as pertinent provides: 
In all ·actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless the same 
are waived, find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry 
of the appropriate judgment . 0 0 
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction that written 
findings of facts and conclusions of law, separately stated, 
must be filed before any judgment can be entered. It is said 
that they are, nthe foundations of the judgment." Reich v. 
Rebellion Silver Min. Co., 3 U. 254, 2 P. 703; In re Thompson's 
Estate, 72 U. 17, 35; 269 P. 103; In the case of Gaddis Inv. 
Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 2d 43, 278 Po 2d 284, this Court stated: 
It has been frequently held that the failure of the 
trial court to make findings of fact on all material 
issues is reversible error where it is prejudicial. (Many 
cases are cited) o 
The findings of fact consist of findings that certain 
plaintiffs are corporations and n1unicipal corporations and 
that the applicant is a corporation and Wayne D. Criddle is 
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the state engineer; that application No. 9593 was filed and 
rejected; that an appeal was taken to the district court; that 
on February 11, 1939, the district court determined that the 
action of the state engineer t twas arbitrary and in violation 
of the rights of the plaintiff''; that between the date of the 
decision and 1958 the applicant and its predecesors had sought 
and been granted extensions of time in which to prove up on 
application No. 9593; that the applicant had requested and 
the state engineer had granted a further extension to March 
31, 1961, and the plaintiffs had filed this action for review. 
The court then finds: 
7. The said determination and order of the Defendant 
State Engineer granting an extep.sion of time was and 
is supported by the evidence and should be affirmed 
except as hereinafter indicated. 
8. Under all the facts and circumstances in this case, 
Defendant Sanpete Water Users' Association has shown 
reasonable diligence in proceeding to prove up on its 
application and to put the water to beneficial use. 
9. The court further finds that said Sanpete Water 
Users Association has shown reasonable cause for delay 
in constructing the entire works and diverting the water 
to the lands in Sanpete Valley. 
The findings set out in full above are the only findings 
on ~e issues of diligence or reasonable cause for delay which 
are the only issues in the case. It is clear that paragraphs 7, 
8 and 9 are conclusions. No facts are actually found. There 
is no finding of any fact which constitutes diligence and there 
is no finding of facts which would entitle the court to conclude 
that there is reasonable cause for delay. The trial court has 
totally ignored the requirements of Rule 52 (a) . The fact of 
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the matter is that no facts were found because none were 
adduced which would support a finding that the applicant 
had diligently proceeded to construct works and apply water 
to beneficial use as intended by section 73-3-12. Likewise, with 
an infeasible project on its hands, the court could not very 
well find facts showing a reasonable cause for delay. The 
decree is therefore without foundation and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 73-3-12, which codifies the doctrine of relation, 
permits the state engineer to grant extensions of time for 
making proof of construction of works and application of 
water to beneficial use. If a proper showing of either diligence 
or reasonable cause for delay is made the state engineer may 
grant extensions and may thus enable the applicant to retain 
its original priority. It is apparent that the applicant has failed 
to make such showing because not only has no construction 
• 
work been done after some 34 years but the applicant has 
not even formulated an approved plan of construction. Un-
contradicted expert testimony indicates that engineering studies 
could have been accomplished in one year. Furthermore, the 
evidence also demonstrates that the project is financially in-
feasible and that there is an inadequate water supply. Finally, 
no facts of diligence or reasonable cause for delay are found 
in the findings of fact and the decree is without foundation. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that the decree herein must 
be reversed. 
E. J. SKEEN 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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